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Objective –This study empirically examines the incidence of CEO dismissal in Malaysian Public Listed 
Companies (PLCs).  
Methodology/Technique – Logistic regression is used in this study to estimate the relationship between 
firm performance, corporate governance and CEO.  
Findings – Using 44 CEO turnover firms in 2010 among financial and non- financial institution, this 
study find that the firm performance, board multiple directorship, family ownership and institutional 
investors influence CEO dismissal. Specifically, firms that have lower performance, have a high 
proportion of board member multiple directorships and controlled by institutional investors are more 
likely to dismiss their CEOs. These results imply that poor performance together with board multiple 
directorship and controlled by large institutional investors are amongst major factor that contribute to 
CEO dismissal. In contrast, we find CEO dismissal is less likely occurred at firms that controlled by the 
family. This result may due to large control by family and in some cases the CEOs are among family 
members.  
Novelty – This paper study on the type of CEO turnover which segregate the type of turnover into 
forced and voluntary turnover. This research idea has limited finding globally as previous research on 
CEO turnover do not separate between forced and voluntary turnover 
Type of Paper: Empirical 
 
Keywords: CEO dismissal; Corporate performance; Board attributes; Ownership structure 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Introduction 
On May 14, 2010 the first high-profile removal of the head of a government-linked company 
was reported in all Malaysian press. The Sime Darby Bhd’s group chief executive, Datuk 
Ahmad Zubir Murshid was asked to take a leave of absence before the expiry of his contract 
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on Nov 26, 2010. The Sime Darby chairman, Tun Musa Hitam comments that Zubir’s leaving 
was in connection with the cost overruns that the group’s energy and utilities division had 
suffered in carrying out projects in Qatar and the Bakun hydro-electric dam (The Star, May 
14). Similarly, in September 2, 2013 U Mobile SdnBhd has lost its second CEO in the span of 
a year-and-a-half. The mobile phone service provider said that it has terminated its CEO Jaffa 
SanyMdAriffin and he ceased to be an employee of the company with immediate effect, citing 
"disciplinary action” as a main reason of termination.  U Mobile SdnBhd comments that 
disciplinary action is taken against Jaffa Sany due to several misconducts and shortcomings 
and lapses in his management. However, the nature of such disciplinary action was not revealed 
and yet based on a news portal, a fall-out with U Mobile chairman and shareholder Tan Sri 
Vincent Tan Chee Yioun was to be blamed for Jaffa Sany's termination (The Sun Daily, Sep, 
2). 
Based on Sime Darby and U Mobile scenario, it can be concluded that the former chief 
executive officer was asked to make their post vacant by board of directors and shareholders 
due to performance problem and due to disciplinary problem. Related to the above reasons, it 
can be said that performance and firm’s governance play an important role in determining CEO 
dismissal. Thus, it becomes a motivation of this study to investigate how performance and 
firm’s governance influence the CEO dismissal in Malaysian Public Limited Companies 
(PLCs). This study focus on CEO dismissal, which is different from other studies conducted in 
Malaysia for example Gibson (2003), DeFond and Hung (2004) and Ishak, Ku Ismail and 
Abdullah (2011). Those studies that mentioned earlier, examine the relationship of CEO 
turnover and corporate governance without classifying CEO turnover type into voluntary and 
forced turnover and findings of their study reveal that Malaysian corporate governance is 
effective as the board of directors react towards firm’s poor performance by terminating their 
underperformed CEOs.  In a different angle, this study is conducted based on suggestion made 
by Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) who argue that voluntary turnover is unlikely to be related 
to performance. Therefore, in order to reduce additional noise in dependent variable, they 
suggest that CEO turnover need to be separated between forced1 and voluntary 
turnover.Following the above argument, this study investigates the effect of corporate 
performance, board characteristics and ownership structures on CEO dismissal. 
This paper is structured as follows: first, the theoretical background is discussed. Next, 
this paper will review the literature and hypotheses development, followed by a discussion on 
methods that are employed in conducting this study. The results of this study are presented in 
the following section. Finally, the conclusion is presented at the end of this paper. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
In general, turnover is defined as a rate at which people leave employment (Cascio, 2002) and 
can be classified into two parts which are routine/voluntary turnovers and non-
routine/dismissals (Kang &Shivdasani, 1995, Denis, Denis &Sarin, 1997 and Maury, 2006). 
They define voluntary turnover as change which is due to normal retirement age of directors 
(age between 54 to 55 year), death or illness or changes in CEO due to mergers and takeovers. 
The forced turnover is due to reasons other than normal retirement. Unfortunately, as noted in 
Weisbach (1988), identification of forced departures is difficult because press releases often 
do not describe them as such.  Poor performance is the most frequently used as reason to 
determine dismissal as CEO is the person who is responsible for a company’s performance. 
The hypotheses development of this study is based on agency theory and social network 
theory. Agency theory is the main underpinning theory which is built on the separation of 
ownership and control in an organization. The separation between ownership and control leads 
to self-interested action by those in managers-controlled firms (Jensen &Meckling, 1976). As 
experts of firm-specific knowledge, managers are believed to have gained advantage over firm 
owners. They may pursue actions which benefit themselves and not the firm’s owners. In order 
                                                          
1  In this study the term of CEO forced turnover is used interchangeable with CEO dismissal. 
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to control the managers’ action, a board of directors and shareholders exist to serve the 
monitoring function.  The social network theory explains how board of directors and 
shareholders used their power to monitor CEO’s action (Phan &Hoon, 1995; Goodstein 
&Boeker, 1991; Datta& Guthrie, 1994; Cannella&Lubatkin, 1993). 
 
2.1 Corporate Performance and CEO Dismisal 
 
Researchers in CEO turnover literature provide prima facie evidence that corporate 
performance is frequently used as an indicator to evaluate the effectiveness of CEO efforts 
(Kaplan, 1994; Suchard et al. 2001; Maury, 2006; Fan et al. 2007). Their studies that address 
the relationship between CEO succession and financial performance rely on accounting-based 
performance measures (e.g, Boyd, 1995; Kang, 1994; Kang &Shivdasani, 1995) and market-
based performance measures as well as combinations of both (Denis & Denis, 1995; Denis, 
Denis &Sarin, 1997). Findings from most of these studies indicate that the dismissal rate of 
CEO is higher for poor performing firms as compared to well performing firms or in other 
words, they find an inverse relationship between CEO turnover and performance. This is 
because the board believes that the underperforming CEO should be penalized for the poor 
performance of the firms. Their results are consistent with the agency theory that the threat of 
turnover will ensure that the CEO’s action is aligned with the shareholders’ interest. Thus, 
based on the above arguments, it is hypothesised that: 
H1: Poorly performing firms are more likely to dismiss their CEOs. 
 
2.2 Corporate Governance and CEO Dismissal 
 
Good corporate governance practices are essential to instil confidence and trust in companies 
and market. Thus, it is believed that good corporate governance can enhance the value of the 
firm by reducing the agency cost associated with separation of ownership and control (Jensen 
&Meckling, 1976; Fama& Jensen, 1983). The board, as a monitoring and disciplining 
mechanism can significantly influence corporate policies and in the case of company failures, 
may take corrective actions by removing inefficient top management. Therefore, it is 
commonly reported that the board plays an important role in removing underperforming CEO.  
Further, Malaysian corporate governance is greatly influenced by the ownership structure 
which has an indirect impact to board composition, board practices and board decisions 
(Zulkafli, Abdul Samad& Ismail, 2003). This situation exists due to the highly concentrated 
shareholding of Malaysia (PLCs) by families and the government. As the major controlling 
shareholders, both family and government are involved in the operation of the companies via 
management or by becoming a member of board committee. Thus, in this situation both board 
and shareholders may have some influences on CEO dismissal.   
 
2.2.1 Board Size 
 
Board size refers to the number of directors who serves on the board (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
There are conflicting views on the appropriate size of the board of directors. The size of a board 
may be increased due to the increase in shareholders activism, consolidation in banking 
industries and increase in firm size (Zulkifli, Abdul Samad& Ismail, 2003). Haleblian and 
Finkelstein (1993) explain that large groups can enhance problem-solving capabilities by 
increasing the amount of information that can be absorbed and recalled. Besides, larger boards 
will increase the number of potential strategies and critical judgment to correct errors in 
inference and analysis. In addition, it will also increase the range of perspectives brought to 
bear on problems. Haniffa and Cooke (2005) argue that bigger boards may be helpful for some 
companies as they provide diversity that would help companies to secure critical resources and 
reduce environmental uncertainties. With smaller board, a CEO could be argued to be familiar 
with all board members and may enjoy some favours to retain his/her position. It is more 
difficult to do so with much larger board. Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
H2:   Firms with large board size will be more likely to dismiss their CEOs.     
 
2.2.2 Board Composition 
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Board composition is referred to as the director type that is widely recognized as a dichotomy 
between inside and outside directors (i.e executives and non-executive directors). 
Outsiders/non-executive directors are not members of the CEO team, their associates, or 
families. They are also not employees of the firm or its subsidiaries and are not members of the 
immediately previous CEO group (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). The proportion of the outside 
directors can be measured in terms of the ratio of outside directors to board size. The presence 
of an outsider into on a board is related to board independence (The Investor Relation Source, 
March 28, 2003). Borokhovich et al. (2006) argue that outside directors is an instrument in 
decisions relating to executive turnover. Weisbach (1988) finds some evidence that when the 
board comprises a majority of outside members, the likelihood of CEO turnover in the US is 
inversely related to firm performance. This is also related with familiarity between a CEO and 
the boards, as a CEO may not have frequent social interactions with outside directors compared 
to insiders which may lead to lessor favours. The result supports the monitoring hypothesis that 
independent directors are more effective monitors as boards react quickly to poor performance 
to replace a CEO. Thus we hypothesised that: 
H3:  Firms with high proportion of outside board members will be more likely to dismiss  
their CEOs. 
 
2.2.3 Board Leadership Structure 
 
The leadership structure of a firm can be divided into combined leadership structure (dual) and 
separated structure (unitary). Dual leadership exists when the CEO also serves as the board 
chairman, while unitary leadership means that different individuals hold the CEO and chairman 
positions. In relation to the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG), there is a 
requirement to balance the power and authority between the Chairman and the CEO and it also 
recommends that a strong independent element should be induced and publicly disclosed in the 
event of CEO duality. Preference for the separation of board leadership structure is largely 
grounded in agency theory regarding the potential for management domination on the board. 
As noted in Dalton et al. (1998, page 272), “according to agency theory, joint structure 
promotes CEO entrenchment by reducing board monitoring effectiveness”. Consistent with 
agency theory prediction, Rechner and Dalton (1991) find that firms with separate board 
leadership structure (unitary) outperformed those firms with the joint structure (duality). Fama 
and Jensen (1983) argue that the concentration of decision management and decision control 
in one individual reduces board effectiveness in monitoring the CEO. Similarly, Jensen (1993) 
points out that the internal controls of a firm would fail when the CEO also holds the position 
of the chairman of the boards. This is because the board cannot effectively perform its key 
functions including those regarding evaluating and firing of CEOs.  Goyal and Park’s (2002) 
study on board leadership structure and CEO turnover support Jensen’s (1993) argument that 
monitoring by board diminishes in firms with combined posts as they find that the probability 
of CEO turnover is likely to be less  sensitive to performance in firms with combined posts 
than in firms with two separate titles. Our hypothesis is: 
H4: Firms with incumbent CEO holding both CEO and chairman posts will be less likely to  
dismiss their CEOs. 
 
2.2.4 Board Members Multiple Directorships 
 
Board members multiple directorships refer to directors that hold more than one directorship2. 
Such directors are considered professional directors because their expertise is needed by more 
than one company. In Malaysia, the MCCG does not prescribe the maximum number of 
directorships per person. However, according to Bursa Malaysia Regulation 2002, Para 15(6), 
a director may not hold more than 25 directorships, specifically not more than ten directorships 
of public listed companies and not more than 15 directorships of non-public listed companies. 
                                                          
2Haniffa and Cooke (2005) claim that the aspect of multiple directorships is often discussed in the literature under 
directorship interlocks. 
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A board with its members having multiple directorships is expected to be a high quality board 
and due to their expertise, directors in poor performing firms may take some aggressive actions 
to overcome their poor firms’ performance (Haniffa& Cooke, 2005). In order to overcome 
performance problem, they may restructure their organizations including firing their CEOs.  
Khurana (1998) finds that multiple directorships correspond to turnover and CEO dismissal is 
more frequent in firms which have a higher proportion of directors with multiple directorships. 
Thus,  we offer the following hypothesis: 
H5:  Firms with board members holding multiple directorships will be more likely to dismiss 
their CEOs. 
 
2.2.5 Family Ownership 
 
Family ownership or family controlled is defined as a control by a family, an individual, or an 
unlisted company (Maury, 2006). A family is assumed to vote collectively. The growth of 
family business shows how dynamic is the family. In terms of the relationship between family 
ownership and firm’s value, McConaughy et al. (1998) find that the founding family-controlled 
firms have more efficient operations as well as higher value relative to non-founding family-
controlled firms. The explanation for this finding is that family ownerships improve monitoring 
while providing incentives that are associated with better firm performance. The same 
argument has been discussed previously by Fama and Jensen (1983) who argue that family 
relationships would reduce the agency cost as the ownership and control is in the hands of a 
single person, thus the need for outside monitoring is reduced. Family-owned businesses may 
have another level of monitoring than other domestically owned firms. Studies by Morck et al. 
(1988) and Maury (2006) find that firms that are managed by members of the founding business 
are less likely to experience managerial succession or be subjected to hostile takeovers relative 
to widely dispersed firms, even in periods of low profitability. The reason is a majority or 69% 
of families that controlled firms also participate in management (La Porta, Silanes&Shleifer, 
1999). With regards to the participation of family in the company’s management, Allen and 
Panian (1982) find that firms in which a family owns five percent or more, CEOs who are not 
family members had a shorter tenure than do CEOs who are family members without the 
controlling interest. Therefore, they suggest that with an increase in family control, board 
members are expected to be more discerning in their assessment of the non- family member 
CEO’s performance, hence increasing the likelihood of turnover. 
H6:  Firms with family ownership will be less likely to dismiss their CEOs.     
 
2.2.6 Institutional Investors 
 
In the year 2002, total institutional shareholdings in Malaysian PLCs stood at 13% of the total 
market capitalization of Bursa Malaysia which is considered high as compared to other nations 
in the region (Effiezal, How &Verhoeven, 2007). Institutional investors are banks, insurance 
companies, retirement funds, hedge funds, or mutual funds that are financially sophisticated 
and makes large portfolio of investment. In Malaysia, institutional investors are encouraged to 
actively participate at the firm’s level to ensure good corporate governance. The 
encouragement is based on the fact that institutional owners are able to commit their resources 
in creating strong and dynamic firms. There are five large public institutional investors in 
Malaysia and all of them are members of the Minority Shareholders Group (MSWG). These 
institutional investors are two pensions fund (the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) and 
LembagaTabungAngkatanTentera (LTAT), an investment fund (PermodalanNasionalBerhad 
(PNB), the pilgrimage fund (LembagaTabung Haji (LTH); and an insurance company 
(National Social Security Organization of Malaysia (SOCSO). According to Effiezal et al. 
(2007), their shareholdings are collectively represent about 70 percent of total institutional 
shareholdings in firm listed on Bursa Malaysia’s Main Board. Gillan and Starks (2003) claim 
that institutional investors can force CEO turnover through activism by voicing their 
dissatisfaction over bad firm performance.  Their suggestion may influence board of directors 
to remove the underperforming CEO.  Further, Aggarwal et al. (2009) suggest that the presence 
of institutional investors can improve the ability to identify and terminate poorly performing 
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CEOs. Their findings documented that firms with higher institutional ownership are more 
likely to terminate poorly performing CEOs.  




Blockholders ownership refers to percentage of shares owned by owners of 5 percent or more 
(Mitton, 2002). The blockholders may be institutions or other individuals. Denis et al. (1997) 
argue that ownership by blockholders is an important internal corporate governance. Higher 
ownership by blockholders can reduce management entrenchment and promote a more active 
board. Thus, it will mitigate agency problems and align the incentives of shareholders and 
managers. Mak and Li (2001) find that blockholding ownership improves the monitoring 
capacity of the board by requiring firms to separate the CEO and chairman roles. As the 
monitoring capacity of the board is effective, the CEOs in poorly performing firms are 
subjected to turnover threat. Denis et al. (1997) find that the sensitivity of turnover-
performance relationship is higher in blockholders ownership. Their empirical evidence 
showed a positive coefficient of blockholders ownership which indicates that the presence of 
blockholders ownership increases the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance.  
H8: Firms with blockholders ownership will be more likely to dismiss   their CEOs.  
 
2.2.8 Control Variables 
 
Firm size, firm leverage, Big 4 auditor and market to book value are among potential firm 
characteristics that may play important roles in assessing the decision of CEO turnover. Firm 
size is measured as natural log of book value over total assets and leverage is defined as the 
book value of long-term debt divided by total assets. The Big 4 is referred to auditor companies 
that audited firms financial statement, namely Ernst & Young (EY), PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PwC), KPMG and Deloitte. Market to book value ratio indicates the growth of the firms. 
 
3. Methods 
Data on CEO dismissal and corporate governance are gathered from company annual reports 
and Bursa Malaysia’s website under the company announcement section, while data for 
corporate performance is gathered from Datastream.  The unit of analysis for this study is 
individual CEO dismissal in Malaysian PLCs. The population of this research comprises of 
companies that are traded and listed on the Main Market and Ace Market of Bursa Malaysia 
including both good and low performing firms during the year 2010.There were 48 cases of 
CEO turnover during 2010. However, after omitting companies with incomplete financial data 
and delisted companies, we finally ended up with 44 dismissals events. The following table 
describes the sample based on its industry classification. 
 
 
        Table 1: Industry Classification 
Industry Frequency Percentage 
Consumer products 11 25.0 







Technology 2 4.5 
Construction 2 4.5 
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IPC 1 2.3 
Finance 1 2.3 
Plantation 1 2.3 
Total 44 100 
Table 1 explains that 68.1 percent of CEOs turnover cases come from industrial product 
consumer product and trading/services industries. These industries are considered as 
homogenous industry and do not depend much on research and development (R&D) and capital 
spending. As a result, due to less complexity in such industries, many suitable candidates can 
be found inside or outside of the firm. Further, in highly competitive industries that consist of 
a large number of homogeneous firms, there is a large pool of suitable CEOs candidates 
compared to a low competition industry. This is because CEO candidates of the former face 
similar working task and environment (DeFond& Park, 1999).  
CEO turnover is determined by comparing the names of CEOs listed in year 2009 with 
the CEO names in year 2011. If there are any changes in the CEO name from the based year, 
then CEO turnover is considered has taken place. Later, the name of changed CEO is compared 
with the announcement made by the company under the section of Change in Boardroom in 
the Bursa Malaysia’s website. The purpose of comparing information gathered from the annual 
reports and company announcement is to ensure that CEO turnover has actually taken place. 
Other information disclose in Change in Boardroom announcement includes date of CEO 
change, announcement date, CEO profiles and reason for change. The type of CEO turnover is 
determined based on the reasons disclosed on the announcements. Succession theory suggests 
that there are at least four voluntary scenarios, namely relay succession, normal retirement, 
early retirement and death or poor health (Friedman & Singh, 1989; Cannella&Lubatkin, 
1993). Regarding dismissal, Dahya et al. (2002) and Huson, Malatesta and Parrino (2004) 
identify dismissal by examining the report released by the press including the Financial Times 
and Wall Street Journal. They labelled turnover as a dismissal when the news articles state that 
the executive was “fired” or “resigned” and in both cases the CEO must be less than 55 years 
old. In addition, if the announcement did not report any reason for the departure as death, poor 
health, or the acceptance of other position elsewhere or within the firm stated, then the 
departure is also classified as dismissal.  A dummy variable is used to determine turnover type; 
“1” is for dismissal and “0” is for voluntary turnover. 
The research model of this study is: 
P(CEO Dismissal =1) = ƒ(CP,BSIZE, BCOMP, DUALITY, BMDR, FAMILY, INST, 
BLOCK, FSIZE, LEV, MTV, BIG4)  
where the dependent variable: P(Dismissal=1) is the estimated conditional probability of CEO 
dismissal and the independent variables are: 
CP       
 
BSIZE 
Firm performance (CP) is proxied by the ROA. The ROA is the ratio of 
accounting earnings before interest and taxes to the book value of assets. 
Number of members on board 
BCOMP Proportion of non-executive directors on board, 
DUALITY         
BMDR 
Equals ‘1’ if chairman is also the CEO. 
Proportion of directors holding at least one additional directorship in another 





Percentage of shares owned by family members direct and indirect  
Percentage of cumulative holding of  shares owned by institutional investors 
(PNB, LTAT, LTH, SOCSO and EPF) and listed as on the top 30 largest 
shareholders. 
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FSIZE    
LEV 
Total percentage of shares owned by individuals or institutions who owned more 
than 5 percent shares 
The size of a firm is measured using natural log of total assets 
Total Debt/total assets 
MTBV     
BIG 4 
Firms’ market to book value for the current year. 
The big four audit firms (EY, PwC, KPMG, Deloitte) 
To estimates this model, the logistic regression is used due to the binary nature of the dependent 
variable that violates the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression assumptions. The dependent 
variable for CEO dismissal is dichotomous; ‘1’ represents CEO dismissal and ‘0’ represents 
voluntary turnover. 
4.0 Results 
From 48 companies that change their CEOs in 2010, 44 companies are included in the analysis 
after excluding incomplete data due to change of financial year and delisting exercise. Table 2 
displays the descriptive statistics for both continuous and dichotomous variables. Our findings 
suggest that in the sample of companies with CEO turnover in 2010, about 75 percent or 33 
companies out of 44 companies involved with dismissal. On average, firms in this study enjoy 
healthy performance with a positive ROA with an average 2.83. On average, there are nine 
members on board with the minimum number of three while the maximum is 15 members. The 
percentages mean of outside members on board is 63.1 percent which suggest that more than 
half of the board members are outside members. This composition follows the suggestion made 
by the MCCG which requires atcomposition follows the suggestion made by the MCCG which 
requires at least one-third (1/3) of the board members to be outsiders. Findings on average 
board size and board composition are similar with results reported by Wan Abdullah, Ismail 
and Jamaluddin (2008) and Wan Hussin (2009)3. Meanwhile, the mean of board members 
multiple directorships (BMDR) is 53 percent, suggests that half of the directors in all sample 
firms hold more than one directorship in other companies. This finding is in line with Mohd 
Saleh, Mohd. Iskandar and Rahmat (2005) as they reported that the mean of board multiple 
directorships in their study is 56.8 percent with a median of 66.7 percent. On average, the 
percentage of shares controlled by family in this sample is 9.08 percent while institutional 
investor and blockholders controlled 6.2 percent and 47.6 percent, respectively.  
        
             Table 2. Descriptive Statistic 
Variables Min max Mean  s.d. Median 
FORCED 0.000 1.000 0.750 0.438 1.000 
ROA -64.020 52.830 2.832 15.984 4.655 
BSIZE 3.000 15.000 8.750 2.422 9.000 
BCOMP 0.000 0.910 0.631 0.182 0.667 
DUALITY 0.000 1.000 0.932 0.255 1.000 
BMDR 0.000 1.000 0.533 0.289 0.564 
FAMILY 0.000 88.920 9.084 20.526 0.000 
INST 0.000 50.000 6.188 9.586 2.405 
BLOCK 0.000 84.690 47.618 22.525 50.845 
                                                          
3  Wan Abdullah et al. (2008)  and Wan Hussin (2009) report that the average of board size is between seven to 
eight members and percentage of non-executive directors on board is around  65 percent and 63% respectively.  
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FSIZE 10.250 17.530 13.809 1.799 14.070 
LEV 0.000 2.600 0.477 0.041 0.490 
BIG4 0.000 1.000 0.682 0.471 1.000 
MTBV 0.180 27.820 1.855 4.516 0.745 
Table 3 presents the correlation analysis. The evidence suggests that on correlation basis, CEO 
dismissal is only significantly associated with leverage but none with the hypotheses variables. 
Firm’s performance is negatively associated (p=-0.419) with family controlled which 
suggested that family firms produce a lower ROA. The size of board is large for firms that 
controlled by institutional investors and have high leverage. The percentage of outside board 
in family firms is lower which indicate that family members will be chosen as executive 
directors in family firms. Further, firms that are controlled by institutional investor tend to have 
high proportion of outside members, high proportion of board member multiple directorships, 
high leverage and large size.  The Big Four auditor is associated with  high leverage firms. 
Firms market to book value has a higher correlation (p=0.567) with ROA. Family business is 
associated with less profitable companies and profitable companies are associated with higher 
market to book value which is expected.  None of the correlation is too high to suggest severe 
multicollinearity threats (see Nunally, 1978). 
Table 3: Correlation Analysis 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1.FORCED 1 -0.064 -0.214 0.080 0.052 0.180 -0.097 0.147 0.123 0.134 -0.350* -0.282 -0.029 
2.ROA  1 0.216 0.132 0.023 0.156 -0.419** 0.223 0.011 0.277 -0.147 -0.008 0.567** 
3.BSIZE   1 0.065 0.009 0.069 -0.077 0.393** -0.058 0.094 0.411** 0.275 0.200 
4.BCOMP    1 0.166 0.147 -0.311* 0.254 0.179 0.060 0.014 0.275 -0.001 
5.DUALITY     1 0.117 -0.079 0.173 0.147 -0.008 -0.014 0.263 0.059 
6.BMDR      1 -0.264 0.299* 0.103 0.350* 0.027 0.245 -0.043 
7.FAMILY       1 -0.120 0.069 -0.430** 0.023 -0.263 -0.127 
8.INST        1 0.281 0.305* 0.299* 0.196 0.182 
9.BLOCK         1 0.014 0.141 -0.272 0.237 
10.FSIZE          1 -0.167 0.199 0.088 
11.LEV           1 0.300* 0.100 
12.BIG4            1 -0.162 
13.MTBV             1 
Results from the logistic regression analysis are presented in Table 4. From seven hypotheses 
variables, four variables namely firm performance, board multiple directorship, family and 
institutional ownership are significant at 5% level and 10% level. This study assumes that poor 
performance lead to CEO dismissal.  Therefore, it is expected that there will be a negative 
relationship between performance and CEO turnover. This study finds a negative and 
significant relationship between CEO dismissal and firm performance. The finding of this study 
is similar to the findings in studies conducted by Kaplan (1994), Suchard et al. (2001) and Tsai 
et al (2006) as finding of those studies revealed that performance is significant in determining 
CEO turnover4. 
Four board attributes were used to demonstrate their relationship with CEO dismissal (i.e; 
board size, board composition, board member multiple directorship and board leadership 
structure). This study fails to support the proposition that large board size leads to CEO 
dismissal. This finding is in line with argument proposed by Jensen (1993) that large boards 
                                                          
4 Kaplan (1994) studied on President turnover in Japan while Surchard  et an. (2001) and Tsai et al. (2006) 
focused on CEO turnover in Australia and Taiwan respectively. 
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are not effective compared to small boards. Further, the oversized board could lead to 
coordination problem which potentially leads to the board becoming less involved in strategic 
decision making. Another board attribute is the proportion of non-executive directors on board. 
Previous studies such as Renneboog (2000) and Borokhovich et al. (2006) found that high 
proportion of outside members on board will increase the ability of board as a monitoring and 
decision making function.In contrast, this study fails to find a significant positive relationship 
between BCOMP and probability of CEO dismissal. This result implies that high proportion 
of non-executive directors on board do not play a significant role in terminating 
underperforming CEOs. This study is consistent with Abdullah (2006) who found that board 
composition is not significant in explaining a firms’ distressed status. In addition, CEO duality 
also do not influence CEO dismissal. This study expects a positive relationship between board 
members with multiple directorships (BMDR) and CEO dismissal. This hypothesis is proposed 
based on the argument that director who hold more than one directorship is considered as 
quality directors which enable to take effective action on the underperforming CEO. The 
finding of this study supports the hypothesis. This finding is  similar with Khurana (1998) and 
Borokhovich et al. (2006). 
Table 4: Logistic Regression 
Variable Expected sign B S.E Wald Sig 
ROA - -0.182 0.097 3.492 0.031 
BSIZE + -0.115 0.310 0.138 0.355 
BCOMP + 0.622 3.844 0.026 0.436 
DUALITY - -0.529 3.220 0.027 0.435 
BMDR + 4.848 3.230 2.253 0.067 
FAMILY - -0.099 0.062 2.574 0.055 
INST + 0.333 0.176 3.594 0.029 
BLOCK + -0.014 0.028 0.270 0.302 
FSIZE + -0.240 0.484 0.246 0.310 
LEV ? -9.525 5.868 2.638 0.053 
BIG4 - -6.091 4.205 2.098 0.074 
MTBV ? 0.105 0.288 0.133 0.358 
CONSTANT ? 13.859 9.691 2.045 0.077 
Cox and Snell R2                                           = 0.460 
Nagelkerke R2                                 = 0.681 
Hosmer and Lemeshow test            = 0.628 
Overall case correctly classified     = 81.8%  
Related to ownership structures, results from this study revealed that firms that are controlled 
by families are less likely to dismiss their CEOs. In addition, change in CEO position in family 
firms is more on voluntary basis. Normally the change of CEO is from father to son or among 
other family member, and the incumbent CEO becomes the chairman or holds another position 
in the company. The rotation of CEO post among family members and the disposition of 
incumbent CEO is a strategy to maintain status quo and control over family firms. Therefore, 
due to commitment and loyalty, even in the case of poor performance, the family-controlled 
firms are less likely to change their CEOs (Allen &Panian, 1982; Maury, 2006). This finding 
is similar to those found in Australia (Maury, 2006) and Taiwan (Tsai et al. 2006) in which the 
family concentrated ownership structure is similar to the Malaysian business environment. This 
study proposes that institutional investors (INST) are actively voicing their satisfaction on 
CEOs’ underperformance; thus it is expected that there is a positive relationship between CEO 
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turnover and institutional investors. This study supports the proposition as we find a positive 
relationship between CEO dismissal and institutional investors. Further, this study expects that 
firms that are controlled by blockholders will have a high probability to change their CEO 
when facing low performance. However, results in Table 4 fail to support the hypothesis as the 
coefficient of BLOCK is not significant. The reason for the insignificant result is perhaps 
because most of the sample firms have ownership structures that are concentrated either by 
family, directors or institutional investors and blockholders are amongst those parties. In 
support of this argument, our correlation analysis suggests that institutional investors and 
blockholdersis significantly correlated at 10% albeit weak. The current study also finds that 
firms with high leverage are less likely to dismiss their CEOs. The evidence also suggests that 
having Big Four auditors is associated with lower probability of CEO dismissal.  
5.0 Conclusion 
The study investigates possible influence of corporate performance and corporate governance 
on CEO dismissal in Malaysia in year 2010. We find that firm performance, board multiple 
directorship, family and institutional ownership are significantly influence CEO dismissal.  
These results suggest that firms that have lower performance, have a high proportion of board 
member multiple directorships and controlled by institutional investors are more likely to 
dismiss their CEOs. These results imply that poor performance together with board multiple 
directorship and controlled by large institutional investors are among major factors that 
contribute to CEO dismissal. Results from this study contribute to the existing literature on 
corporate governance which specifically focuses on two internal elements of corporate 
governance mechanism, namely the ownership structure and board attributes and how these 
two elements influence CEO dismissal in Malaysian PLCs. This is important for Malaysia as 
there are limited studies to date that investigate the effectiveness of a firm’s corporate 
governance in monitoring CEO’s actions. 
Small sample size that consists of one year period only is the major limitation of this study 
as results from this study cannot be generalized. Another limitation is the determination of 
dismissal as no specific definition given for dismissal. As the turnover does not meet the four 
criteria of voluntary turnover5 then the turnover is classified as dismissal. Furthermore, 
information disclose in Bursa Malaysia’s website related to changes in boardroom need to be 
more comprehensive and detail including reason for board changes. Thus, the policy maker 
especially the SC and other regulators need to put more emphasis in order to provide 
transparency information the users.  
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